Algorithmic assurances from advanced autonomous systems assist human users in understanding, trusting, and using such systems appropriately. Designing these systems with the capacity of assessing their own capabilities is one approach to creating an algorithmic assurance. e idea of 'machine self-con dence' is introduced for autonomous systems. Using a factorization based framework for self-con dence assessment, one component of self-con dence, called 'solver-quality', is discussed in the context of Markov decision processes for autonomous systems. Markov decision processes underlie much of the theory of reinforcement learning, and are commonly used for planning and decision making under uncertainty in robotics and autonomous systems. A 'solver quality' metric is formally de ned in the context of decision making algorithms based on Markov decisions processes. A method for assessing solver quality is then derived, drawing inspiration from empirical hardness models. Finally, numerical experiments for an unmanned autonomous vehicle navigation problem under di erent solver, parameter, and environment conditions indicate that the self-con dence metric exhibits the desired properties. Discussion of results, and avenues for future investigation are included.
INTRODUCTION
anks to advances in AI and machine learning, unmanned autonomous physical systems (APS) are poised to tackle complex decision making problems for high-consequence applications, such as wilderness search and rescue, transportation, agriculture, remote science, and space exploration. APS must be self-su cient and make self-guided decisions about complex problems delegated by users. Hence, APS that are taskable-able to translate high-level commands into suitable processes for sensing, learning, reasoning, communicating, and acting -must also be cognizant and knowledgerich-capable of reasoning about the capabilities and limitations of their own processes, anticipating possible failures, and able to recognize when they are operating incorrectly [6] .
is work is motivated by the need to develop new computational strategies for assessing when an APS reaches its competency boundaries. If computed and communicated correctly, such assessments can provide users with clearer predictions of APS behavior and understanding of actual APS capabilities.
is can not only allow APS to take initiatives to stay within its competency boundary in untested situations, but also provide users/stakeholders with assurances that allow them to properly calibrate trust in (and hence make proper use of) intelligent APS [13] . ese properties are especially important for APS that must rely heavily on non-deterministic algorithms for decision-making under uncertainty, i.e. to e ciently make approximate inferences with imperfect models, learn from limited data, and execute potentially risky actions with limited information. Whereas most relevant and recent work on algorithmic introspection and meta-reasoning to date has focused on outcome-based analyses for AI/learning agents with narrow well-de ned tasks, holistic process-based techniques for algorithmic competency boundary self-assessment are needed to accommodate broader classes of APS operating in complex, dynamic and uncertain real-world se ings -whose computational models and approximations are expected to break down in less obvious/foreknown ways.
is paper presents and builds on a recently developed algorithmic framework for computing and evaluating self-assessments in APS that leads to shorthand metrics of machine self-con dence. Self-con dence is de ned as an APS' perceived ability to achieve assigned goals a er accounting for uncertainties in its knowledge of the world, its own state, and its own reasoning and execution abilities [2, 3, 22] . Algorithmic computation of self-con dence is strongly linked to model-based assessments of probabilities pertaining to task outcomes and completion-but crucially goes further to provide insight into how well an APS's processes for decisionmaking, learning, perception, etc. are matched to intended tasks [11] . We argue that the short-hand insight provided by self-con dence assessments can serve as a transparent and decomposable/traceable feedback signal to anticipate degraded, nominal, or enhanced APS performance, and thereby can be used to calibrate user trust in APS for uncertain task se ings. e main contributions of this paper include: 1) A formal denition of 'solver-quality' which is one of several factors that make up 'self-con dence'. Herein, solver-quality is presented as a metric for assessing how competent an MDP solver is for a given task. 2) Solver-quality is then derived borrowing inspiration from empirical hardness models (EHMs [17] . 3) Solver-quality is then evaluated using numerical experiments. e paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we further explore motivations and background for self-con dence, including concepts like trust between humans and autonomous systems, and a useful example application. In Section 3 Factorized Machine Self-Con dence (FaMSeC) is introduced and a framework outlined. At the end of Section 3 we turn our a ention to one of the FaMSeC factors, 'Solver ality', and outline speci c challenges and desiderata in the context of the broadly useful family of Markov Decision Process (MDP)-based planners. A learning-based technique for computing solver quality factors in MDP-family planners is then derived in Section 4. In Section 5 we present results from numerical experiments for an unmanned autonomous vehicle navigation problem. Finally we present conclusions in Section 6.
BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
is section reviews several key concepts and related works which set the stage for our proposed computational machine self-con dence framework. To make the concepts discussed throughout the paper concrete and provide an accessible proof-of-concept testbed in later sections, we also describe a motivating APS application example inspired by ongoing research in unmanned robotic systems.
Autonomous Systems and User Trust
An APS is generally any physical agent comprised of a machine controlled by some form of so ware-based autonomy. Autonomy de nes the ability of the system to perform a complex set of tasks with li le/no human supervisory intervention for extended periods of time. is generally means that an APS has at least one or more of the capabilities of an arti cially intelligent physical agent, i.e. reasoning, knowledge representation, planning, learning, perception, motion/manipulation, and/or communication [13] . Despite many popular myths and misconceptions, an APS always interacts with a human user in some way [4] . at is, the aforementioned capabilities are the means by which an APS achieves some intended degree of self-su ciency and self-directedness for tasks that are delegated by a user in order to meet an 'intent frame' (desired set of goals, plans, constraints, stipulations, and/or value statements) [18] . 'Transparency' in this context thus shi s primary concern away from details of how exactly an APS accomplishes a task, towards knowing whether an autonomous system can/cannot execute the task per the user's intent frame. In cases where users must reexamine delegated tasks, the ability to interrogate an APS for details related to how tasks would be executed or why tasks can/cannot be completed become an important follow-on consideration for transparency (i.e. on a need to know 'drill-down' basis).
is view naturally sets up several questions related to user trust in autonomous systems. Trust de nes a user's willingness and security in depending on an APS to carry out a delegated set of tasks, having taken into consideration its characteristics and capabilities. We focus here on the problem of how an APS can be designed to actively assist users in appropriately calibrating their trust in the APS. As surveyed in [13] , several broad classes of algorithmic assurances for APS have been developed, where an assurance is de ned as any property or behavior that can serve to increase or decrease a user's trust. Good assurances are challenging to develop because they must allow users to gain be er insight and understanding of APS behaviors for e ectively managing operations, without undermining autonomous operations or burdening users in the process. Many assurance strategies, such as value alignment [7] (where an APS adapts its behavioral objectives with a user's intent frame via interactive learning) and interpretable reasoning [20] (where algorithmic capabilities for planning, learning, reasoning, etc. are made accessible and easy to understand for non-expert users) put the onus on the APS (and designers) to integrate naturally transparent trust-calibrating behaviors into core system functionality. Other strategies, such as those based on post hoc explanation for learning and reasoning systems [16, 19] and data visualization [21] , require users to render their own judgments via processing of information provided by the APS (possibly in response to speci c user queries). Indeed, while the full range of assurance design strategies for APS have much in common with techniques for ensuring transparency and accountability for more general AI and learning systems, assurances based on self-monitoring o er an especially promising path for APS competency assessment.
Self-Monitoring and Self-Con dence
State of the art machine learning and statistical AI methods have ushered in major improvements to APS capabilities in recent years. Yet, as these methods and capabilities continue to improve and nd new high-consequence applications, resulting APS implementations are also becoming more complex, opaque and di cult for users (as well as designers and certifying authorities) to fully comprehend. In particular, for sophisticated APS characterized by uncertaintybased reasoning and data-driven learning, it can become extremely di cult to make precise predictions about APS behavior and performance limits in noisy, untested, and 'out of scope' task conditions with any degree of certainty. Formal veri cation and validation tools could be used to tackle these issues at design time, but do not provide assurances that can be readily conveyed to or understood by (non-expert) users at run-time. It can thus be argued that the task of assessing APS competency at run-time is in general so complex and burdensome that it should also be delegated to the APS itself.
is leads to consideration of algorithmic self-monitoring methods, e.g. for introspective reasoning/learning [9] , fault diagnosis and computational meta-reasoning/meta-learning [8] . While promising for a wide variety of applications, these methods depend heavily on task outcome and performance assessments, and o en require data intensive evaluations. As such, these methods are o en best-suited to APS with narrow, well-de ned, capabilities and few computational resource constraints. However, many current and future APS must operate in open-ended task se ings in physical environments with signi cant computational limitations (due to constrained platform size, weight, power, etc.). e interpretation of 'favorable vs. unfavorable' task outcomes can also shi in subtle yet signi cant ways that may not be obvious to non-expert users, i.e. depending on the interactions of designed APS capabilities and task context (all of which may also change drastically over the course of a given operational instance). ese limitations motivate consideration of process-based assessment techniques that allow APS to more generally self-qualify their capabilities for a particular task by evaluating and reporting their associated degree of 'self-trust' or self-con dence. As evidenced by recent work in neurocomputational modeling of decision-making for visual-motor tasks, self-con dence reporting in humans generally requires second-order reasoning about uncertainties associated with particular task outcomes, i.e. assessments of 'uncertainties in uncertainty' as well as of one's own reasoning processes [1] . is resonates with the machine self-con dence concept put forth by [11] , who proposed using human expert evaluations of speci c APS capabilities to manually encode where and when these may break down in particular tasking situations. Several formal de nitions and techniques for allowing APS to automatically compute their own machine self-con dence scores in the context of di erent tasks and capability assessments have been proposed recently. For instance, Kuter and Miller [15] proposed to evaluate plan stability for systems that rely on hierarchical task planning algorithms, using formal counter-planning methods to determine threatening contingencies for a given plan and plan repair techniques in order to assess the adaptability of that plan to circumvent those contingencies. is relies heavily on xed knowledge bases and ontologies, and so only supports assessments for well-understood environments, tasks, systems, and contexts. ese and other approaches are reviewed in [22] , as well as in [13] in the context of algorithmic interactions for human-autonomous system trust relationships. For the sake of brevity, we restrict a ention to the de nition of self-con dence used in this work: An agent's perceived ability to achieve assigned goals (within a de ned region of autonomous behavior) after accounting for (1) uncertainties in its knowledge of the world, (2) uncertainties of its own state, and (3) uncertainties about its reasoning process and execution abilities.
MDP-based Planning and Learning
e diversity of factors that in uence APS self-con dence requires a rich modeling approach for algorithmic assessment. We will therefore establish algorithmic realizations of self-con dence assessments by initially studying APS capabilities that can be dened or modeled via Markov decision processes (MDPs). MDPs are composed of nite states and actions that partially resolve the nondeterminism in the state transitions by deciding from what probability distribution p(·) the next state will be sampled. e coexistence of nondeterministic and stochastic choices in MDPs are expressive enough to account for a range of uncertainties including adversarial environmental factors and inaccuracies in execution. Since MDPs also have well-established connections to other widely used approaches for autonomous decision-making and learning under uncertainty, such as partially observable MDPs (POMDPs) for decision-making in limited observability environments and reinforcement learning for decision-making with incomplete model information [14] , they provide an ideal starting point for an initial analysis of self-con dence that can be generalized in future work.
More formally, we consider generic MDP formulations of a task T delegated to an APS. In an MDP framing of T , the autonomous agent must nd an optimal policy π = u(x) for an MDP with dynamical state x and actions u, such that the objec-
is maximized for all times k = 0, ..., ∞ -where R(x k , u k ) rewards (penalizes) the APS for being in (un)desirable states and taking (un)desirable actions, E[·] is the expected value over all possible future states, and γ ∈ (0, 1] is a (tunable) future discount factor. Given any u k , the state x k updates via a Markov probabilistic transition model
x i is fully observed at time i (no sensor noise), while transitions i → k +1 have random perturbations. In a fully posed MDP, π is the optimal state-action policy, which can be recovered from Bellman's equation via dynamic programming. However, in many practical situations, policy approximationsπ may still be required, e.g. to cope with very large state dimensions or structured uncertainties in the state transition distribution [14] .
VIP Escort Example Application.
Consider a concrete grounding example problem based on the "VIP escort" scenario [10] , which serves as a useful proxy for security and surveillance applications with unmanned robotic vehicles (see Fig. 1 ). An unmanned ground vehicle (UGV) leads a small convoy protecting a VIP through a road network monitored by friendly una ended ground sensors (UGS). e road network also contains a hostile pursuer that the UGV is trying to evade while exiting the network as quickly as possible. e pursuer's location is unknown but can be estimated using intermi ent data from the UGS, which only sense portions of the network and can produce false alarms. e UGV's decision space involves selecting a sequence of discrete actions (i.e. go straight, turn le , turn right, go back, stay in place). e UGS data, UGV motion, and pursuer behavior are all stochastic, and the problems of decision making and sensing are strongly coupled: some trajectories through the network allow the UGV to localize the pursuer before heading to the exit but incur a high time penalty); other trajectories a ord rapid exit with high pursuer location uncertainty but increase the risk of ge ing caught by the pursuer, which can take multiple paths. A human supervisor monitors the UGV during operation. e supervisor does not have detailed knowledge of the UGV -but can interrogate its actions, as well as potentially modify its decision making stance ('aggressively pursue exit' vs. 'be very conservative and cautious') in order be er cope with the pursuer (which is sporadically observed and follows an unknown course). e physical states describing the combined motion of the UGV (whose states are always perfectly observable) and pursuer can be discretized in time and space to produce a Markov process model de ned by some initial joint state probability distribution and joint state transition matrix, which depends on the steering actions taken by the UGV. e probability of obtaining 'detection' and 'no detection' data from each UGS given the true state of the pursuer can be modeled and used to update probabilistic beliefs about the state of the chaser. Finally, a reward function R(x k , u k ) = R k can be specied for each time step k to encode user preferences over the combined state of the UGV and pursuer, e.g. R k = −1 for each time step the UGV is not co-located with the pursuer but not yet at the exit, R k = −1000 if the UGV and pursuer are co-located, and R k = +1000 if the UGV reaches the exit without ge ing caught. Given these elements, the UGV's navigational planning and decision-making problem may be generally formulated as a POMDP. In special the case where the pursuer's state is fully observable at each step k (e.g. due to very reliable and accurate UGS that cover all areas of the road network), the problem reduces to an MDP.
SELF-CONFIDENCE FACTORIZATION AND CALCULATION
is work seeks to develop algorithmic strategies for assessing and communicating machine self-con dence. Of particular interest are model-based techniques that endow an APS with a processdriven scoring of how it arrives at decisions, and what factors in uence the quality of its reasoning, in order to quantitatively assess its own competency boundaries. As such, it is important to formally establish both: (i) a set of principles, de nitions, and relations that govern the 'arithmetic of machine self-con dence' as a function of task, environment, system realization, and context, and (ii) variables, representations and operations for producing meaningful self-con dence assessments.
We initially address these issues for APS that are primarily dened by capabilities for dynamic decision-making and planning under uncertainty. is approach provides a pathway to developing rm initial mathematical and computational bases for addressing (i) and (ii) via the rich set of analytical and computational features inherent to the MDP model family. A er reviewing a computational framework for self-con dence assessment that relies on assessing individual factors involved with solving MDP-based planning and decision-making problems, we consider how one of these factors (related to the quality of a given MDP policy solver) can actually be computed, building on insights derived from calculation and analysis of another factor (related to intrinsic task di culty) examined in other work.
e FaMSeC Framework
e approach presented here adopts and builds on the Factorized Machine Self-Con dence (FaMSeC) framework developed in ref. [2, 3] .
e key idea behind FaMSeC is to represent and compute selfcon dence as a traceable multi-factor function, which combines shorthand assessments of where and when operations and approximations inherent to model-based autonomous decision-making are expected to break down. As with the self-con dence reporting strategy developed in [11] , this captures metrics than an expert designer would use to assess the correctness and quality of an autonomous decision-making system, accounting for variations in task, environment, system implementation, and context. However, unlike [11] , FaMSeC allows an APS to automatically generate its own holistic assessments of self-con dence, i.e. without the need for a human designer/expert to specify a priori how self-con dent a system ought to be given such variations Figure 2 illustrates FaMSeC's notional overall self-con dence scoring mechanism. is uses a set of self-con dence factors (dashed lines) that are derived from core algorithmic decision-making components (white boxes in the 'Autonomy' block). e total selfcon dence score can be mapped onto an arbitrary scale, e.g. -1 to +1 for the sake of discussion, where -1 gives a shorthand indication of 'complete lack of con dence' (i.e. some aspect of task, environment, or context falls completely outside the system's competency boundaries), and +1 indicates 'complete con dence' (i.e. all aspects of task, environment, and mission context are well within system's competency boundaries). As will be shown later, the scales for each factor need not all be the same and can carry slightly di erent qualitative interpretations, as long as a clear sense of 'con dence direction' (i.e. degree of self-trust) can be established for each. Ref. [2] considers ve general factors that contribute to a 'total self-con dence score', which notionally maps the multivariate the combined set of individual factors into an overall con dence report:
(1) x I -interpretation of user intent and task: To what extent were the user's intentions properly understood and translated by the autonomous system into contextappropriate mission speci cations and tasks? is factor derives from features and parameters of the 'Interpreter' block. For instance, if a natural language interface is used for mission planning, this factor could assess how well user inputs are mapped to reward functions using xed vocabularies for di erent mission pro les. (2) x M -model and data validity: Are the agent's learned and/or assumed models, and associated training data used for decision-making good enough proxies for the real world? is factor assesses how well the set of measurements and events predicted by the autonomous system line up with what it actually should observe in reality.
(3) x Q -solver quality: Are the approximations and learningbased adaptations used by the system for solving decisionmaking problems appropriate for the given mission and model? Since approximations are almost always needed to solve otherwise intractable decision making problems, this factor examines the appropriateness and reliability of those approximations. is factor also accounts for the impact of learning mechanisms required to make complex decisions under uncertainty, e.g. based on suitability of training data or the learning process to solving the problem at hand. (4) x O -expected outcome assessment: Do the sets of possible events, rewards, costs, utilities, etc. for a particular decision lead to desirable outcomes? Even if the autonomous system perfectly understands and analyzes a task, and can arrive at globally optimal solutions, it may still not be able to always avoid running into undesirable states along the way. is factor evaluates the particular decision making strategy implemented by the system to assess the inherent favorability of the full landscape of possible task outcomes. (5) x P -past history and experiences: What can be gleaned from the system's own experience and other available historical information for past problem instances? is factor notionally allows the autonomous system to predict, transfer, and update assessments of self-con dence based on prior experiences, and thus embodies meta-memory and meta-learning for enabling and improving self-assessments.
Since the overall self-con dence mapping is heavily dependent on application, context, and desired levels/types of user-autonomy interaction, this work assumes for simplicity that the overall mapping consists of a direct report of some xed subset of the component factors, i.e. x SC ={x I ,x M ,x Q ,x O ,x P }. Furthermore, the ve factors considered here are neither exclusive nor exhaustive. For example, the factors developed by [2, 3] are primarily aimed at self-assessment prior to the execution of a particular task, whereas it is conceivable that other self-con dence factors could be included to account for in situ and post hoc self-assessments. For simplicity, a ention is restricted to the a priori task self-assessment case.
3.1.1 VIP Escort Example Revisited. We will use the VIP Escort scenario to examine two immediate questions: (i) how should the factors be expected to behave under di erent conditions (independently of how they are actually calculated)?, and (ii) how should any one these factors actually be calculated?
To address (i), we should rst consider what kinds of trends, 'boundary conditions', and interactions are expected for the various factors if we are given some class of solver for the underlying UGV motion planning problem. For instance, if the problem were modeled and encoded as a discrete-time/discrete-space MDP, then sampling-based Monte Carlo solvers could be used to nd an approximately optimal policy π [5] , which would map joint UGVchaser state information onto speci c UGV actions to maximize the UGV's expected cumulative reward. Figure 3 shows some expected behaviors for the FaMSeC factors for such a solver, as a function of task, environment, system, and context, assuming again an arbitrary nite range of -1 (total lack of con dence) to +1 (complete con dence) for illustration only. For instance, x Q would be expected to increase/decrease as the number of samples used by the Monte Carlo solver to approximate π increased/decreased. Similar trends could also be derived for other non-sampling based solvers.
With this in mind, an important issue to consider for addressing (ii) is that the factors can depend on each other in complex ways. A logical simplifying assumption for initial algorithm development is thus to consider cases where we can ignore the interactions between factors; this is equivalent to examining each factor along 'boundary conditions' where other factors do not change and thus have little/no contribution to the overall self-con dence score. For example, ref. [2] developed an approach to compute x O for in nite horizon MDP and POMDP planning, assuming the boundary conditions x M = +1 (perfectly known problem/task model), x I = +1 (perfectly interpreted user task command and reward function R k ), x Q = +1 (optimal policy π known and available), and x P = +1 (task encountered previously). Under these conditions, overall self-con dence depends only on x O , which can then be quanti ed as a measure of the probability distribution p π (R ∞ ) of achievable cumulative reward values R ∞ = ∞ k =0 R k under policy π . Ref. [2] considers several measures of p π (R ∞ ), including the logistically transformed upper partial moment/lower partial moment (UPM/LPM) score, which quanti es how much probability mass lies to the right vs. le of a minimally acceptable cumulative reward value R * ∞ (e.g. in the basic VIP Escort problem, this corresponds to a user-speci ed maximum acceptable time to successfully reach the exit).
By indicating how likely favorable outcomes are expected relative to unfavorable outcomes according to a baseline performance measure R * ∞ , self-con dence measures like the UPM/LPM score provides information about the consequences of applying policy π to a task by interpreting the full shape of the cumulative reward distribution p π (R ∞ ), i.e. beyond just the mean value of R ∞ (which the optimal π maximizes) or the variance/entropy of p π (R ∞ ). As illustrated in Fig. 4 this allows x O to be used as a second-order uncertainty measure for assessing intrinsic task di culty-and hence indicates a measure of APS competency that can be reported to users to calibrate their trust.
Since ref. [2] does not specify how to compute other factors, nor how to cope with interdependencies between factors that will arise when assumptions such as those above are relaxed, it is natural to consider how these insights extend to computation and analysis of other FaMSeC factors. For instance, what does information related to the assessment of x O tell us about how other factors should be assessed? In particular, since x O indirectly depends on x Q , we next consider how to use p(R ∞ ) to also derive a metric for x Q . Namely, if we consider that an MDP-based APS must in practice o en rely on an approximate policyπ instead of the true optimal policy π , then a quantitative comparison of pπ (R ∞ ) to p π (R ∞ ) provides a metric for x Q . e remainder of this paper explores how strategies for assessing x Q along these lines (under the progressively relaxed assumption of x M =+1, x P =+1, and x I =+1).
Solver
ality (x Q ) e main aim of x Q is to indicate how a solver S will perform on a given (possibly un-encountered) task T of a given class c T (i.e. all road networks with a UGV, Pursuer, and exit, et cetera as described previously). e need for x Q is not necessarily easy to understand; an analogy helps to clarify:
Clarifying Example: One could informally think of x Q as an indication of the ability of an athlete. is is opposed to the athlete's assessment of the desirability of the outcome of a game (x O ). While an athlete may be very capable (high x Q ), the score of the game may be such that the athlete knows that it is nearly impossible to catch up and win the game (low x O ). Conversely, an athlete may not be very capable (low x Q ), and due to being naïve has an incorrect assessment of the desirability of the outcome (x O cannot be trusted). e formal desiderata for x Q are:
D1 re ect competence of solver S for task T (where competence is analogous to the 'ability' of the athlete in the example) D2 enable comparison across solver classes D3 extend to unseen tasks of the same class c T For practical application, it is critical to be able to compare the quality of solvers of di erent classes (i.e. exact vs. approximate) because there are many di erent ways of solving tasks. Likewise, it is also common for an APS to encounter a similar, but previously unseen, task (i.e. a di erent road network).
Evaluating the 'quality' of something implies some kind of comparison is taking place. In this se ing the desired comparison is between a 'candidate solver' S and some reference solver. Ideally, the candidate solver could be compared to the exact solution (whose quality is by de nition perfect), but there are three main challenges:
C1 It is unclear how policies/solvers should be compared C2 Large state spaces make exact solutions infeasible C3 It is generally impossible to evaluate the exact solution for all tasks of a given task class c T (linked to D3) 3.2.1 Addressing C1. Solvers of all classes are similar in that they operate on a speci ed problem in order to produce a policy π that is a mapping from states to actions with the aim of maximizing expected reward. A few possibilities for comparing policies include:
( 
Training Data Trusted Candidate Figure 5 : Key values involved in calculating x Q , where x represents a 'parameter of interest' for task T , or solver S.
• Merits: Meets D1, also able to satisfy D2 as reward distributions can be simulated from any policy • Demerits: Expensive to calculate the reward distribution via many simulations
Of the possibilities listed above, item 3 will be used because only it is able to satisfy D1 and D2.
3.2.2
Addressing C2, and C3. In order to address C2 a 'trusted solver' S * could be introduced as the reference to which the candidate solver S can be compared. is solver need not be exact (but could be). Ultimately, S * is only required to be a reference of some kind; it may be optimal, or it may be abysmal. In fact given a space of all possible unseen tasks of class c T , S * will likely perform very poorly for some of them.
Still, according to C3, it is impractical, or impossible, to nd an exact solution for all tasks task class notation. Literature on 'Empirical Hardness Models' (EHMs) lends some direction for confronting this challenge. In their work [12, 17] introduced EHMs in order to predict the empirical runtime performance (as opposed to the 'Big-O' runtime) of an algorithm on a problem with given features. Speci cally, they investigate how the actual runtime of NP-complete problems can be predicted. Applying similar logic in the domain of APS, it should be possible to learn a surrogate model M * (T ) that predicts the reward distribution R * of a trusted solver S * for a given task T of class c T . In this way it is possible to estimate the performance of S * on problems to which it has never been applied. is approach also addresses D3.
3.2.3
Summary. e comparison of policies will be done through comparing reward distributions; this approach addresses both D1 and D2, along with C1. In order to address C2, C3, and D3 a 'trusted solver' S * will be introduced to serve as a basis by which a 'candidate solver' S can be evaluated. Furthermore, a surrogate model M * (T ) will be learned to predict R * on un-encountered tasks. In this way, all desiderata, and challenges have been addressed. 
METHODOLOGY
How, then, can x Q be calculated? Following from discussion in the previous section, a surrogate model M * (T ) can be learned to predict the reward distribution R * of the trusted reference solver S * on task T as shown in Fig. 6a . e candidate solver S must then be evaluated w.r.t. the trusted solver S * . is is done by comparing R * (the predicted performance of S * on task T ) and R (the simulated performance of solver S on task T ) as illustrated in Fig. 6b . Figure 5 illustrates some of the key quantities involved in calculating x Q . e basic premise is: nd the di erence between the trusted (T ) and candidate (C) solvers while taking into account the overall range of rewards of the trusted solver over many tasks.
Learning M * (T )
e surrogate model M * (T ) can be any model capable of predicting R * given T . In the formulation presented above R * i only represents the mean and standard deviation for R * i (this makes the learning problem less complicated, but is not necessary). Figure  6a depicts how the surrogate model is trained. Learning M * (T ) would typically be done 'o ine' and in a supervised manner when more computation power and time are available. Later M * (T ) can be deployed for use on an APS.
Calculating x Q
In order to compare two solvers the resultant reward distributions that each of those solvers produce are compared. If two solvers produce an identical reward distribution for a given task, then they can be considered equal in their 'quality', or considered equally 'capable'. Conversely, if the two distributions are very di erent for the same task, then their quality, or capability, is also di erent.
Hellinger
Metric H 2 . Perhaps the easiest way of calculating the similarity between distributions is to nd the 'distance' between them, the Hellinger metric (H 2 ) is such a measure. It is bounded between 0 and 1, where 0 means the distributions are identical. e maximum distance, 1, is achieved when one distribution P assigns zero probability at every point in which another distribution Q assigns probability. H 2 has di erent forms based on the type of analytical distributions being compared. For the purposes of calculating x Q from two distributions P ∼ (µ 1 , σ 1 ) and Q ∼ (µ 2 , σ 2 ) the following form is useful:
Using H 2 the overlap between T and C can be calculated. However, there are a couple of other considerations that need to be taken into account.
4.2.2
Di erence in Expected Reward: ∆µ. H 2 as a distance measure is always greater than zero, and so information that indicates if a distribution is generally be er or worse (i.e. more or less expected reward) is lost. In order to keep this information the sign of the di erence between the expected rewards of the two distributions sgn(µ 1 − µ 2 ) can be used.
Global Scale:
(r H − r L ). e next consideration is that just because distance between two distributions may be great or small, does not mean the same applies from a higher-level, or global, perspective. In an extreme case one might imagine two Normal distributions with means µ 1 = 1 and µ 2 = 2, and low variances σ 2 1 = σ 2 2 = 1e-5. In this case the Hellinger distance between the two would be 1 since they share practically no overlapping probability. However, if the means of the distributions are nearly equal on the global scale (e.g. rewards from many other training tasks are on the range [−1e3, 1e3]), then the quantity of H 2 isn't the critical factor.
4.2.4
Pu ing the pieces together. Using the points discussed above the expression for the quality of candidate solver S w.r.t. the reference solver S * is (again see Fig. 5 for intuition):
Where ∆µ = µ c − µ t , and f = ∆µ/(r H − r L ). e exponent α is a parameter that a ects the in uence that f has with respect to H 2 . In essence, should the relationship of the e ects of f and H 2 be 1 : 1? In practice α = 1 does not yield desirable results. H 2 should be more in uential on q as f grows smaller, and f should be more in uential as it increases. We have found α = 1/2 gives results that 'make sense'; future work could investigate the 'best' value for α via user studies.
Accommodations For Humans.
While H 2 is on the domain [0, 1], the quantity f is [0, ∞]. Because of this it is desirable to use a 'squashing function' to keep the reported x Q value within some bounded range and avoid arbitrarily large values that can be confusing to humans. e general logistic equation is useful for this. e numerator is 2 so that when q = 0 (distributions are identical) x Q will be 1. Dividing the quantity q by 5 so makes it so that x Q 'saturates' at around q = ±1.
Examples
A toy example is useful in evaluating whether x Q yields desirable results. Figure 7 illustrates a such an example, depicting the expected reward (with uncertainty) for a trusted solver S * given a speci c, generic, task/solver parameter, as well as that of a 'candidate' solver S. Di erent points of interest (indicating speci c Figure 7 : Assessing x Q calculation on reward fxn's: S * (blue) and S (red). Points of interest indicated by a star.
values of the task parameter) are highlighted by a star. e table on the side shows the values of x Q calculated for di erent cases. At B the candidate solver has a lower expected reward than the trusted solver and a higher variance than the trusted solver. Intuitively x Q should be less than one. As shown when r = 5 (i.e. r H − r L = 5, the global reward range is 'large') x Q = 0.667 which indicates that the candidate solver is marginally less capable than the trusted solver, and when r = 0.05 then x Q = 0.002 indicates that S is much less capable than S * .
At C the candidate solver S has higher expected reward than S * , but a larger variance. Intuitively we would expect x Q of S to be a li le greater than one, and in fact when r = 5, x Q = 1.095. As the global reward range r decreases the di erence in capability between S and S * increases with x Q = 1.995 at r = 0.005. ese calculations indicate that x Q performs as expected. In Sec. 5 a more realistic scenario is considered.
RESULTS
In order to investigate how x Q performs on a more realistic scenario the VIP escort problem introduced in Sec. 2.3.1 will be used. While the original problem is de ned as a POMDP, here we investigate a somewhat simpler version of the problem, and instead use fully observable MDPs.
is is reasonable because x Q operates on reward distributions, which are produced by policies on any decision making problem. e bene t of using MDPs is that they are computationally less burdensome than POMDPs, while still being capable of being applied to complex decision problems.
In order to nd a policy for the MDP, a Monte-Carlo Tree Search (MCTS) solver will be used [5] . As the name suggests MCTS involves building a tree from the starting state of the UGV and simulating a speci ed number of actions/transitions into the future in order to calculate the utility of each state. is process is repeated many times, and the utilities of each state are updated a er each iteration. e actions selected by MCTS are based not only on the current utility of the state, but an exploration parameter that helps ensure that the search doesn't simply exploit the greatest known utilities. An MCTS solver is convenient to use during these experiments because the quality of the solver can be easily changed by modifying the parameters. e road network is represented as shown in Fig. 8a . e UGV begins at the yellow node (node 1), the pursuer begins at the red node (node 4), and the desired exit is indicated by the green node (node 13). e problem is de ned by the parameters listed in Table 1 (a) Road network N=13 (b) Road network N=45 Figure 8 : Example road networks. UGV starts at yellow, Pursuer beings at red, and the exit is green. e transition probability of the UGV. is is the probability that the UGV will move in the desired direction when a empting to move. ere is a probability of 1 − t p r ob that it will go to a di erent neighboring cell. d MDP discount factor N e number of nodes included in the road e mc t s e exploration constant parameter of the MCTS. d mc t s e depth of the MCTS tree it s mc t s e number of Monte-Carlo simulations to run to nd the policy r wd e x i t e reward for the UGV successfully exiting the road network r wd c au ht e reward for the UGV being caught by the pursuer r wd s e ns e e reward for making a movement ree separate evaluations were completed. First, x Q was calculated for MCTS solvers with varying depth parameters (all others held constant). Second, x Q was evaluated for a candidate solver with varying task parameters. Finally, x Q was evaluated for a candidate solver with varying task and solver parameters.
Varying A Solver Parameter
is evaluation involved experiments 1 and 2 from Table 2 . MCTS Solvers of varying depths were used to nd solutions to each of the two networks. In each case one of the solvers was chosen as the trusted one (i.e. chose a 'good' solver). In the case of experiment 1 S * was the d mct s = 9 solver, and in experiment 2 S * was the d mct s = 25 solver. A surrogate M * (T ) was not used for this evaluation, instead R * was calculated directly and used for comparison.
e results for experiment 1 are shown in Fig. 9a . As expected x Q between S * and itself is 1.0. We see that candidate solvers depth 6 through 10 are about equivalent to S * (and each other), which indicates they are similarly capable of solving the problem. Whereas candidate solvers with depth 1 through 3 are much less capable than the trusted solver. e results of experiment 2 are shown in Fig. 9b , where S * with d mct s = 5 has been selected. According to the plot only solvers of depth 22, and 28 have similar capability to S * . Note, that the d mct s = 1 solver has x Q = 0.83, this is most possibly due to the fact that the depth 1 solver will make decisions based on li le foresight, while solver with depths from 4 to 19 have enough foresight to hesitate and accumulate negative rewards from not moving quickly. An important insight is that while the d mct s = 9 solver is very capable of solving the small network from Fig. 8a , that performance does not extend to the medium sized network from Fig. 8b . e d mct s = 7 and 10 solvers are very incapable compared to the trusted solver of d mct s = 25, this is re ected by the value of x Q .
Varying A Task Parameter
Experiment 3 was used for this evaluation, where S * is a depth 8 solver, while the two candidate solvers were depth 3 and depth 1. e surrogate model M * (T ) was learned using two generic deep neural networks with three hidden layers. One network to learn to predict the mean reward, and the other to predict the standard deviation (M * (T ) here uses the output of two models). In a fairly simple problem such as this one a DNN of this con guration is likely overkill, but it demonstrates the possibility of using an arbitrarily complex black box model for M * (T ). Figure 10a shows the results for S with d mct s = 3 at two di erent values of p t r ans . At p t r ans = 0.25 S is slightly more capable than S * . Whereas, at p t r ans = 0.75 S is slightly less capable. Figure 10b shows the results for the candidate solver with d mct s = 1 at two di erent values of p t r ans . At p t r ans = 0.25 the candidate solver is moderately less capable than the trusted solver. Whereas, at p t r ans = 0.75 the candidate solver is slightly much less capable. ese values correspond to expected behavior of x Q .
Varying Task and Solver Parameters
Experiment 4 was used for this evaluation, where S * is a depth 8 solver, while the two candidate solvers were depth 3 and depth 1. Both p t r ans and e mct s were variable for the experiments. e results are found in Figs. 11a and 11b. e surrogate M * (T ) used here is the same as in the previous evaluation (i.e. two DNNs to predict mean and standard deviation). Figure 11a shows the results for S with d mct s = 3 at two di erent points of interest. At A S is slightly less capable than S * , x Q is similar at B as well. Figure 11b shows the results for S with d mct s = 1 at two different points of interest. At A S is slightly more capable than S * . Whereas, at B S is moderately worse than S * .
CONCLUSIONS
Unmanned autonomous physical systems are able to tackle complex decision making problems for high-consequence applications, but in order to be able to reduce the amount of supervision required these systems need to be able to perform self-assessment, or introspection. We draw on Factorized Machine Self-Con dence (FaMSeC) which is a framework of self-assessments that enable an APS to quantify its own capabilities.
Speci cally, herein, we have motivated and derived a one of the factors of FaMSeC called 'Solver ality' (x Q ) that indicates the ability of some solver to perform on a given task. Calculating x Q relies only on a supervised model of a trusted solver, and simulated reward distributions of candidate solvers. is approach was inspired by literature on empirical hardness models (EHMs). We have shown by numerical experiments that x Q , as derived here, meets the desired criteria. Concerning x Q , it remains to be seen, and is currently le for future work, whether it actually helps users to be able to understand the capabilities and limitations of the APS. Evaluations with human participants are required. e simulations run so far have not directly considered 'di erent classes' of solvers, however as x Q only depends on reward distributions R, and R * this is not a limitation. Also, since the calculation of x Q generally depends on R * predicted from M * (T ) it would be prudent to enable the surrogate to predict R * as well as an associated uncertainty in order to have an indication of where M * (T ) can be trusted.
Another direction for future work is to develop approaches for the remaining three FaMSeC factors. Each of the individual factors re ects a critical meta-assessment of the competency of the APS.
